From the Classical School to Today: The Evolution of Stagnation Theories by Lukacovic, Francis J, II
State University of New York College at Buffalo - Buffalo State College
Digital Commons at Buffalo State
Applied Economics Theses Economics and Finance
5-2016
From the Classical School to Today: The Evolution
of Stagnation Theories
Francis J. Lukacovic II
State University of New York College at Buffalo - Buffalo State College, franklukacovic@gmail.com
Advisor
William T. Ganley, Ph.D., Professor of Economics
First Reader
William T. Ganley, Ph.D., Professor of Economics
Second Reader
Ted P. Schmidt, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Economics
Third Reader
Bruce L. Fisher, J.D., Visiting Professor and Director
To learn more about the Economics and Finance Department and its educational programs,
research, and resources, go to http://economics.buffalostate.edu/.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/economics_theses
Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, and
the Political Economy Commons
Recommended Citation
Lukacovic, Francis J. II, "From the Classical School to Today: The Evolution of Stagnation Theories" (2016). Applied Economics Theses.
15.
http://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/economics_theses/15
i 
 
From The Classical School to Today: The Evolution of Stagnation Theories 
by 
Francis J. Lukacovic II 
 
 
 
An Abstract of a Thesis 
in 
Applied Economics and Finance 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
 
 
 
Master of Arts 
 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Buffalo State College 
State University of New York 
Department of Economics and Finance 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the theory of secular stagnation, which was made famous 
by the American Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen in his book Full Recovery or Stagnation.  
The theory of secular stagnation has reappeared in economic circles today due to recent 
economic conditions since the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  The thesis will analyze the history 
of the stagnation theory dating back to Classical economists in the 19th century.  The concept of a 
stagnating economy has been talked about for centuries with many economists adding important 
thoughts.  Furthermore, the thesis will address the current questions and examine whether the 
stagnation claims have merit in today’s economy.  High unemployment and slow economic 
growth in developed countries including the United States may be explained by the theories of 
secular stagnation and the matured economy. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 Recently, there has been a renewed discussion on the idea of secular stagnation.  The 
recovery from the great recession of 2008 has seen the economy experience low growth and a slow 
decline in unemployment.  Secular stagnation, a term introduced to us by Alvin Hansen, an 
American economist is the idea that the economy has stagnated due to structural changes and is 
not just a normal downturn in a business cycle.   
 In 2013, former Treasury Secretary and former National Economic Council director 
Lawrence Summers made a case that the United States could be facing secular stagnation at an 
International Monetary Fund conference.  Since then, there has been plenty of discussion on the 
theory.  Summers has gone back and forth with former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke on the validity of the theory in today’s world. 
 The idea of a stagnating economy is not new.  It dates back to Classical economists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century.  A theory of population introduced by Thomas Malthus served 
as a basis for stagnation theories from various economists of the Classical era.  Karl Marx also 
developed a theory of stagnation as well, expanding on the ideas from Classical economists.  Next, 
Thorstein Veblen developed his own stagnation theory.  Lastly, we get to Keynes and Alvin 
Hansen who developed the most advanced theory of stagnation. 
 In this thesis, we will examine the evolution of the various stagnation theories and look to 
the writings of these prominent economists to explain each school of thought’s theory.  Also, we 
will examine any solutions that each economist proposed as a way to avoid stagnation in a capitalist 
economy.   
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 Chapter two will be devoted to the study of the Classical school and their views on 
capitalistic stagnation.  First, we will explain the Malthusian theory of population to provide a 
basis for the Classical school of thought.  Then, we can continue to examine the theories of John 
Stuart Mill and David Ricardo.  In Chapter three, we examine Marx’s outlook on the future of 
capitalistic society and his theory of stagnation.  Chapter four will introduce Institutional 
economics and the writings and ideas of Thorstein Veblen.  We will analyze his thoughts on 
stagnation.  Chapter five deals with John Maynard Keynes and how his analysis of the economy 
has an underlying idea of stagnation.  In Chapter six, we get to the idea of secular stagnation and 
the matured economy.  Alvin Hansen contributed a lot to these ideas which are still important 
today.  Chapter seven dissects the debate today between Lawrence Summers, Ben Bernanke, and 
others.  And finally in Chapter eight, we have concluding remarks. 
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Chapter Two: Classical Economists on Stagnation 
 
 The early theories of stagnation put forward by Classical economists were, by a large 
extent, based on Thomas Malthus’ argument in An Essay on the Principles of Population.  So, we 
will first analyze these principles before presenting the stagnation theories of David Ricardo and 
John Stuart Mill.   
 The Malthusian theory of population states that the means of subsistence limits the 
population of the earth and that the food supply will increase in an arithmetical ratio, while the 
population will increase in a geometrical manner (Malthus I, 1933, pp. 8-10).  Therefore, the food 
supply would not be able to keep up with population growth over the long term.  Malthus revised 
his theory of population in the second edition, but some economists failed to address this in their 
economic writings.  In later editions of the Principles of Population, he denied that the ‘Law of 
Diminishing Returns’ would lead civilization to a gloomy end.  Instead, he proposed that man may 
take precautions to prevent this end of society (Malthus I, 1933, pp. 341).   
 Malthus would go on to explain, in the first edition, his opinion on the growth of population 
and the food supply with: 
The necessary effects of these two different ratios of increase, when brought 
together, will be very striking.  Let us call the population of this island 11,000,000; and 
suppose the present produce equal to the support of such a number.  In the first twenty-five 
years the population would be 22,000,000, and the food being doubled, the means of 
subsistence would be equal to the increase.  In the next twenty-five years, the population 
would be 44,000,000, and the means of subsistence only equal to the support of 33,000,000.  
In the next period the population would be 88,000,000, and the means of subsistence just 
equal to the support of one-half that number.  And, at the conclusion of the first century, 
the population would be 176,000,000 and the means of subsistence only equal to the 
support of 55,000,000, leaving the population of 12,000,000 totally unprovided for 
(Malthus II, 1933, pp. 126-127). 
 
4 
 
 Up until the publication of Malthus’ An Essay on the Principles of Population, political 
economy had upheld the optimistic outlook that Adam Smith had introduced in The Wealth of 
Nations.  Adam Smith insisted “every increase in the stock or revenue of society as increase in the 
funds for the maintenance of labor” (Malthus, 1933, pp. 128-129), but Malthus rejected this idea 
and held “that the funds for the maintenance of labor do not necessarily increase with the increase 
of wealth, and very rarely increase in proportion to it” (Malthus, 1933, p. 129). 
 The Malthusian theory of population began to catch on with political economists and 
industrialists.  E.A.J Johnson described this fascination clearly in his book Some Origins of the 
Modern Economic World:  
The Malthusian theory of population fell like Mana from Heaven into the hands of 
English capitalists.  Here was a convenient explanation of poverty and low-wages, a body 
of social theory supported by an imposing parade of facts which proved the universality of 
a ‘Natural’ principle of population.  Here then was a philosophical fount in which factory 
owners could wash their unclean hands.  Low wages had their origin in the ‘passion 
between the sexes’ which resulted in a natural tendency for population to outstrip the food 
supply.  For these conditions surely the employer of labor could not be held responsible; 
in fact, he was rather a social benefactor who have employment to a large number of those 
super-poor.  The real culprits were the parents who, by failing to curb their reproductive 
propensities, had brought into existence these unfortunate children whom factories 
employed (Johnson, 1938, pp. 108-109). 
 
 The Malthusian theory of population laid the foundation for the Classical School’s 
stagnation theory.  Classical Economists such as David Ricardo and Alfred Marshall have held 
that production is limited by ‘The Law of Supply and Demand’ and ‘The Law of Diminishing 
Returns.’  The Malthusian theory of population reveals the ‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’, as 
it states that as additional amounts of capital or labor are added to production past an optimum 
point the profits to be gained will be less and less with each addition of capital or labor (McConnell, 
1947, p. 121). 
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 Now that we have explained some of the ideas presented in Malthus’ An Essay on the 
Principles of Population, we can now understand the Classical School’s theory of stagnation better.   
More specifically, we will examine the views of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. 
David Ricardo’s Stagnation Theory 
 
 Classical economist David Ricardo develops his theory of stagnation in his Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation.  He develops the stagnation theory that was underlying in the 
works of Malthus and his predecessors.  Through Ricardo’s theory of rent and his examination of 
the tendency of profits to fall in manufacturing, his stagnation theory is given life. 
 In his theory of differential fertility of land, Ricardo accepts Malthus’ establishment of 
‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’.  This creation of the differential fertility of land leads to one 
of Ricardo’s arguments that the economy of a capitalistic society will end in stagnation.  John W. 
McConnell describes Ricardo’s idea of rent: 
Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of 
the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers 
of the soil.  There is no rent when land of nearly equal fertility is present in sufficient 
abundance to supply human demands.  When an increase in population causes land of 
inferior quality and less advantageous situation to be called into cultivation, then rent is 
paid.  Assuming the presence of land of three degrees of quality, let us suppose an increase 
in population creates a demand for food, making it necessary to call into cultivation the 
land of the second quality.  The greater the costs of production, either in labor or 
transportation, will cause the price to rise.  Obviously, the smaller costs of production on 
the first quality land in relation to the price paid for each unit of the product will yield a 
surplus to the first land over the second.  This, says Ricardo, is rent.  If further increase in 
population brings the land of the third quality into production, rent on both first and second 
quality land will rise.  The price of natural products will be determined by the higher labor 
costs necessary to produce the additional quantities needed under the least favorable 
circumstances (McConnell, 1947, pp. 55-56). 
 
 Ricardo showed that differential rents on land of several qualities tended to drive down 
profits.  If the falling rate of profit of a farmer merely hurt him, it would not force the economy 
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into stagnation; however, “there are few commodities which are not more or less affected in their 
price by the rise of raw produce, because some raw material from the land enters into the 
composition of most commodities” (Ricardo, 2001, p. 90). 
 Ricardo said the natural rates of profits is to fall based on his examination of “The Law of 
Diminishing Returns’ and his theory of the differential fertility of land.  He summarized: 
The natural tendency of profits, then is to fall; for, in the progress of society and wealth, 
the additional quantity of food required is obtained by the sacrifice of more and more labor.  
This tendency, this gravitation as it were of profits, is happily checked at repeated intervals 
by the improvements in machinery connected with the production of necessities, as well as 
by the discoveries in the sciences, which enables us to relinquish a portion of labor before 
required, and therefore to lower the price of the prime necessities of the laborer.  The rise 
of labor is, however, limited; for as soon as wages should be equal to 720 pounds, the 
whole receipts of the farmer, there must be an end to accumulation, for no capital can yield 
any profit whatever, and no additional labor can be demanded and consequently population 
will have reached its highest point (Ricardo, 2001, pp. 96-99). 
 
 Ricardo contended that without improved technology the economy would end in stagnation 
because of the difference in profits to be derived from lands of differing qualities.  He also later 
argues in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation that increased technology will only prevent 
stagnation for a brief period of time.   Ricardo was of the opinion that the discrepancy between 
fixed and circulating capital would drive the economy into stagnation, this despite improvements 
were made in the state of industrial arts: 
Were it true that the proportion between these two sorts of capital is the same at all times, 
and in all countries, then indeed, it follows that the number of laborers employed is in 
proportion to the wealth of the state.  But such a proposition has not the semblance of 
probability.  As arts are cultivated, and civilization is extended, fixed capital bears a larger 
and larger proportion to circulating capital.  The amount of fixed capital employed in the 
production of a piece of British muslin is at least a hundred times, probably a thousand 
times greater than that employed in the production of a similar piece of Indian muslin.  And 
the proportion of circulating capital is a thousand times less.  It is easy to conceive that 
under certain circumstances, the whole of the annual savings of an industrious people might 
be added to fixed capital, in which case they would have no effect in increasing the demand 
for labor (Ricardo, 2001, pp. 385-387). 
7 
 
 
 With his acceptance of the Malthusian law of population and the differential theory of rent, 
and his theory of the downward trend of profits due to the discrepancy between fixed and 
circulating capital, Ricardo described a very bleak future of the capitalistic society.  Eric Roll 
summarizes Ricardo’s views compared with other Classical economists in his History of Economic 
Thought:  
It has been the fashion in recent years to regard Ricardo’s work as the most distinct 
exposition of the beliefs contained in the classical theory that the economic system 
automatically achieved full employment and market equilibrium through time, and that 
fluctuations of economic activity or prolonged stagnation were impossible.  Closer 
examination reveals, however, that Ricardo’s analysis, because it penetrated to greater 
depths than did that of his contemporaries, was by far the least polished statement of these 
classical beliefs.  It left open many problems to which subsequent theories of crises and 
under-employment could be attached.  Many theories of technological unemployment or 
of disproportions in the structure of production can be traced back to the views enunciated 
by Ricardo.  And the Marxian theory of crises, too, has a close connection with Ricardo’s 
theory of economic development (Roll, 1942, pp. 204-205). 
 
 We will later look at the Marxian theory of stagnation but now we will examine the 
stagnation theory of John Stuart Mill. 
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John Stuart Mill’s Stagnation Theory 
 
 Next, we will examine the works of John Stuart Mill in an attempt to discover his thoughts 
on the prospect of a stagnating economy.  Mill’s theory of stagnation also grows out of the 
Malthusian theory of population growth and he also thought the loss of savings would drive the 
economy into stagnation as Classical economists believed all funds for investment must be derived 
from the savings of the community.  The modern-day concept of banks creating money through 
loans was not a practiced (McConnell, 1947, pp. 150-160). 
The capacity of increase is necessarily in a geometrical ratio; the numerical ratio is 
different. 
To this property of organized beings, the human species forms no exception.  Its power of 
increase is indefinite, and the actual multiplication would be extraordinarily rapid, if the 
power were exercised to the utmost.  It is never exercised to the utmost and yet, in the most 
favorable circumstances known to exist, which are those of a fertile region colonized from 
an industrious and civilized community, population has continued, for several generations, 
independently of fresh immigration, to double itself in not much more than twenty-five 
years (Mill, 1965, pp. 153-155). 
 
 Besides the Malthusian law of population growth, Mill also believed that the ‘Law of 
Diminishing Returns’ would also ultimately lead to a stationary state.  He wrote in his Principles 
of Political Economy: 
Though the general thriftiness of the laboring class is much below what is desirable, the 
spirit of accumulation in the most prosperous part of the community requires abatement 
rather than an increase.  In these countries there would never be any difficulty of capital, if 
its increase were never checked or brought to a stand by too great diminution of its returns.  
It is the tendency of the returns to a progressive diminution, which causes the increase of 
production to be often attended with a deterioration in the conditions of the producers; and 
this tendency, which would in time put an end to increase of production altogether; is a 
result of the necessary and inherent condition of the production from the land (Mill, 1965, 
pp. 187-88). 
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 Despite there being a plethora of capital and technical knowledge at the time, Mill still held 
a pessimistic outlook of the future due to his belief in the ‘Law of Diminishing Returns’. 
When a country has long possessed a large production, and a large net income to make 
savings from and when, therefore, the means have long existed of making a great annual 
addition to capital; it is one of the characteristics of such a country that the rate of profit is 
habitually within as it were, a hand’s breadth of the minimum, and the country therefore 
on the very verge of the stationary state (Mill, 1965, p. 446). 
 
 According to Mill, the only way to cure stagnation would be to cut the wages of the laborer 
or to force into the labor market those persons not engaged in productive labor.  However, Mill’s 
suggestions were not seriously believed by himself or his followers.   
On the whole, therefore, we may assume that in such a country as England, if the present 
amount in such a country as England, if the present amount of savings were to continue, 
without any of the counteracting circumstances which now keep in check the natural 
influence of those savings in reducing the profits, the rate of profit would speedily attain 
the minimum, and all further accumulation of capital would for the present case (Mill, 
1965, p. 448). 
 
When Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations in 1776, he created an optimistic 
spirit of capitalism.  But within less than one hundred years, we find John Stuart Mill, a follower 
of Smith having a much more pessimistic view due to his view of the tendency of profits to fall 
and the ‘Law of Diminishing Returns’.  Mill summarized his negative view: 
This impossibility of ultimately avoiding the stationary state – this irresistible necessity 
that the stream of human industry should finally spread itself out into an apparently 
stagnant sea – must have been, to the political economists of the last two generations, an 
unpleasing and discouraging prospect, for the tone and tendency of their speculation goes 
completely to identify all that is economically desirable with the progressive state (Mill, 
1965, pp. 451-452). 
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 David Ricardo saw capitalistic society headed towards stagnation because of the 
differential rates of rent on lands of differing qualities and because of the discrepancy between 
fixed and circulating capital.   
 John Stuart Mill believed capitalistic society stagnating due to the ‘Law of Diminishing 
Returns’, the Malthusian theory of population, and the loss of investment funds for the 
improvement of the country.  
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Chapter Three: Marxian Economics on Stagnation 
 
 In the previous chapter, we showed that David Ricardo in his Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation and John Stuart Mill in his Principles of Political Economy believed that 
capitalistic society would end in stagnation.  They based their theories on the Malthusian principles 
of population, ‘The Law of Diminishing Returns’, and the tendency for profits to fall because of 
the discrepancy between fixed and circulating capital.   
 Karl Marx and his followers saw the future of capitalism in a very negative light.  They 
believed it would eventually lead to an economy of stagnation, privation, and general misery 
amongst people.  We will now look into the reasoning and theory behind Marx’s belief in 
stagnation.   
 Marx, in the first volume of Capital, rejected the validity of the Malthusian theory of 
population.  Marx stated that “an abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and 
only insofar as man has not interfered with them” (Marx, 1909, p. 271).  He did speak on a “surplus 
population” however: 
The production of a relative surplus-population, or the setting free of laborers, goes on 
therefore yet more rapidly than the technical revolution of the process of production that 
accompanies, and is accelerated by, the advances of accumulation; and more rapidly than 
the corresponding diminution of the variable part of capital as compared with the constant.  
If the means of production, as they increase in extent and effective power, become to a less 
extent means of employment of laborers, this state of things is again modified by the fact 
that in proportion as the productiveness of labor increases, capital increases its supply of 
labor more quickly than its demand for laborers.  The overwork of the employed part of 
the working class swells the ranks of the reserve, whilst conversely the greater pressure 
that the latter by its competition exerts on the former, forces these to submit to overwork 
and to subjugation under the dictates of capital.  The condemnation of one part of the 
working-class to enforced idleness by the overwork of the other part, and the converse 
becomes a means of enriching the individual capitalists, and accelerates at the same time 
the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the advance of 
social accumulation (Marx, 1947, 697-699). 
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He believed that capitalistic society would be forced into stagnation by ‘The Industrial 
Reserve Army of the Unemployed’, and by the ‘Law of the Increasing Misery of the Proletariat’.  
Marx, in analyzing a formula of growth saw capital as an independent variable and labor as a 
dependent variable.  Over time, capital will control labor because of technological advancements.  
The disposable industrial army reserve would continue to grow as technology improves leading to 
a lower return on surplus-value. 
But if a surplus laboring population is a necessary product of accumulation or the 
development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus production become, conversely, 
the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode 
of production.  It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite 
as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost.  Independently, of the limits of the 
actual increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of 
capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation.  With accumulation, and 
the development of the productiveness of labor that accompanies it, the power of sudden 
expansion of capital grows also.  The mass of social wealth, overflowing with the advance 
of accumulation, and transformable into additional capital, thrusts itself frantically into old 
branches of production, whose market suddenly expands, or into newly formed branches, 
such as railways, the need for which grows out of development of the old ones. In all such 
cases, there must be the possibility of throwing great masses of men suddenly on the 
decisive points without withdrawing them from the other branches of production.  
Overpopulation supplies these masses.  The course characteristic of modern industry, viz., 
a decennial cycle (interrupted by smaller oscillations) of periods of average activity, 
production at high pressure, crisis and stagnation, depends on the constant formation, the 
greater or lesser absorption, and the reformation of the industrial reserve or surplus 
population (Marx, 1909, pp. 275-277). 
 
In his theory of surplus-value, Marx found his way to a conclusion of capitalistic 
exploitation of the working class, which is also found in the works of John Stuart Mill and David 
Ricardo.  John McConnell described Marx’s theory of surplus value as: 
Labor is paid on the basis of its physical reproduction and maintenance costs; but the 
laborer is required to work hours over and above the necessary to meet these costs.  Thus 
every additional hour that he works above the point necessary to produce sufficient articles 
to supply the laborer’s reproduction and maintenance costs (his wages), he is producing 
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value which is appropriated by the employer.  This value above his reproduction and 
maintenance costs is surplus-value (McConnell, 1947, pp. 33-34). 
 
 The Marxian theory of stagnation also focuses on the theory of constant and variable 
capital.  Constant capital referred to the value of the part of capital put out by the capitalist for 
acquiring means of production, such as, raw and auxiliary materials, and instruments of labor is 
therefore not altered in the course of the process of production.  Variable capital is the value of the 
part of capital used to purchase labor power and is altered during the process of production.  It 
reproduces its own value and yields a surplus-value over and above constant capital.  This surplus-
value can be greater or less as the case may be.  This part of capital is being continually transformed 
from a constant or unchangeable magnitude into a variable or changeable one.  Therefore, it is 
called variable capital (Marx, 1906, pp.  232-233). 
 Marx describes the difference between constant capital and variable capital in the following 
passage: 
Suppose a capitalist to employ a hundred workmen, at thirty pounds a year each, in a carpet 
factory.  The variable capital annually laid out amounts, therefore, to 3,000 pounds.  
Suppose also that he discharges fifty of his workers, and employs fifty with machinery that 
costs him 1,500 pounds.  To simplify the matter, we take no account of buildings, coal, etc.  
Further suppose that the raw material annually consumed costs 3,000 pounds, both before 
and after the change.  Is any capital set free by this metamorphosis?  Before the change, 
the total sum of 6,000 pounds consisted half of constant, and half of variable capital.  After 
the change it consists of 4,500 constant (3,000 pounds raw material and 1,500 pounds 
machinery), and 1,500 variable capital.  The variable capital, instead of being one half, is 
only one quarter of the total capital.  Instead of being set free, a part of the capital is here 
locked up in such a way as to cease to be exchanged against labor-power; variable has been 
changed into constant capital (Marx, 1906, pp. 478-479). 
 
 The preceding observation by Marx on the different compositions of constant and variable 
capital led him to his creation of the Law of Falling Tendency of the Rate of Profit.  The law states 
that with each new addition of capital to the constant capital there will be a reduction in the amount 
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of variable capital.  The capitalist makes his profits from the exploitation of the laborer.  So, if 
more capital is put into machinery, the capitalist receives less surplus-value since only labor can 
produce surplus-value.  The increased use of machinery, therefore, leads to the fall of the rate of 
profits, and eventually leads to stagnation because of the loss of surplus-value upon which basis 
the capitalistic system rests (Marx, 1909, pp. 247-249). 
 If the average rate of profit for society tends to fall due to the difference in the makeup of 
constant and variable capital, how would stagnation be prevented according to Marx?   
 Marx stated in his theory of The Law of Concentration that larger industries would band 
together in order to obtain more surplus-value from the worker and jointly share the burden of the 
increasing amounts of constant capital.  He also believed the stagnation caused by discrepancy of 
constant and variable capital might be postponed by the following methods, such as, cheapening 
the elements of constant capital, raising the intensity of exploitation, depression of wages below 
their value, relative overpopulation, and foreign trade (Marx, 1909, pp. 272-278). 
 Before Marx, economists were somewhat pessimistic and predicted stagnation in the long 
term.  However, Marx and his followers left no doubt as to the future of capitalistic society. 
The barriers of the capitalistic mode of production becomes apparent after our study: 
1. The fact that the development of the productive powers of labor creates in the 
falling rate of profit a law which turns into an antagonism of this mode of 
production at a certain point and requires for its defeat a periodic crisis. 
2. The fact the expansion or contraction of production is determined by the 
appropriation of unpaid labor, and by the proportion of the unpaid labor to the 
materialized labor in general, or to speak the language of the capitalist, is 
determined by profits and by the proportion of this profit to the employed 
capital, by a definite rate of profit, instead of being determined the relation of 
production to social wants, to the wants of socially developed human beings.  
The capitalistic mode of production, for this reason, meets with barriers at a 
certain scale of production which would be inadequate under different 
conditions.  It comes to a standstill at a point determined by the production and 
realization of profit, not by the satisfaction of social needs (Marx, 1909, p. 303). 
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Answering the question of methods of preventing stagnation, Marx said “…capitalistic 
production is continually engaged in the attempt to overcome these imminent barriers, but it 
overcomes them only by means which again place the same barriers in the way in a more 
formidable size” (Marx, 1925, p. 293). 
Marx believed that capitalistic society would come to an end when the Reserve Army of 
the Unemployed forced by the Law of Increasing Misery of the Proletariat arose and revolted 
against their oppressors, and established over themselves the Dictatorship of the Proletariat until 
the masses were trained to no longer need any form of government whatsoever.  Without this 
revolution, Marx saw no actual solution to the dilemma posed by the laws of capitalistic production 
and the eventual stagnation of the economy. 
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Chapter Four: Institutional Economics on Stagnation 
 
Institutional economics has many followers but for our purpose of analyzing the views on 
stagnation, we will mainly focus on the writings of Thorstein Veblen.  Before continuing to our 
examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation in capitalistic societies, we must first examine some 
of the preconceptions of Institutional economics.  
The economic thought of the Classical economist is based in Classical philosophy with its 
doctrines of ‘Natural and Immutable Laws’, and the Malthusian theory of population.  Marxian 
economist’s thought is founded in the idealistic philosophy of Hegel.  The economic thought of 
Institutional economists is based on the same preconceptions of ‘Instrumentalism’ of John Dewey 
and the ‘Pragmatism’ of William James.  In other terms, Institutional economics, Instrumentalism, 
Pragmatism, and Logic are all based on the doctrines of the Metaphysical Club, founded by Charles 
S. Pierce in the 1860s.  The club was attended by William James, John Fiske, Chauncey Wright, 
and a few other intellectuals from Cambridge (Hofstadter, 1945, pp. 105-106). 
Thorstein Veblen’s theory of stagnation, which we will examine more closely, is based on 
a dichotomy of technology and institutions.  The dichotomy in Veblen’s thinking develops from 
his early training in Hegelian philosophy (Dorfman, 1947, pp. 40-45) and from the teachings of 
Charles S. Pierce (Daugert, 1950, pp. 16-25).  However, this dichotomous thinking of Veblen may 
also be observed in John Dewey’s thinking – for technology substitute education and for the 
imbecile institutions substitute “the quest for certainty” (Dewey, 1929). 
Veblen’s theory of economic stagnation of society may be best captured from his analysis 
of the machine process and business enterprise.  Veblen defines the machine process in the 
following way: 
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In its bearing on modern life and modern business, the machine process means something 
more comprehensive and less external than a mere aggregate of mechanical appliances for 
the meditation of human labor.  It means that, but it means something more than that.  The 
civil engineer, the mechanical engineer, the navigator, the mining expert, the industrial 
chemist and the mineralogist, the electrician – the work of all these fall within the line of 
the modern machine process, as well as the work of the inventor who devises the appliances 
of the process and that of the mechanician who puts the inventions into effect and oversees 
their working.  The scope of the process is larger than the machine.  In those branches of 
industry in which the machine methods have been introduced, many agencies which are 
not to be classed as mechanical appliances, simply have been drawn into the process and 
have become integral factors in it.  Chemical properties of minerals, e.g., are counted on in 
the carrying out of metallurgical processes with much the same certainty and calculable 
effect as are the motions of those mechanical appliances by whose use the minerals are 
handled.  The sequence of the process involves both the one and the other, both the 
apparatus and the materials, in such intimate interaction that the process cannot be spoken 
of simply as an action of the apparatus upon the materials.  It is not simply that the 
apparatus reshapes the materials: the materials reshape themselves by the help of the 
apparatus.  Similarly, in such other processes as the refining of petroleum, oil, or sugar; in 
the work of the industrial chemical laboratories; in the use of wind, water, or electricity 
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 5-6). 
 
Veblen goes on to define business enterprise: 
The economic welfare of the community at large is best served by a facile and uninterrupted 
interplay of the various processes which make up the industrial system at large; but the 
pecuniary interests of the business men in whose hands lies the discretion in the matter are 
not necessarily best served by an unbroken maintenance of the industrial balance. 
Especially is this true as regards those greater business men whose interests are very 
extensive. The pecuniary operations of these latter are of large scope, and their fortunes 
commonly are not permanently bound up with the smooth working of a given Sub−process 
in the industrial system. Their fortunes are rather related to the larger conjunctures of the 
industrial system as a whole, the interstitial adjustments, or to conjunctures affecting large 
ramifications of the system. Nor is it at all uniformly to their interest to enhance the smooth 
working of the industrial system at large in so far as they are related to it. Gain may come 
to them from a given disturbance of the system whether the disturbance makes for 
heightened facility or for widespread hardship, very much as a speculator in grain futures 
may be either a bull or a bear. To the business man who aims at a differential gain arising 
out of interstitial adjustments or disturbances of the industrial system, it is not a material 
question whether his operations have an immediate furthering or hindering effect upon the 
system at large. The end is pecuniary gain, the means is disturbance of the industrial 
system, − except so far as the gain is sought by the old−fashioned method of permanent 
investment in some one industrial or commercial plant, a case which is for the present left 
on one side as not bearing on the point immediately in hand (Veblen, 1904, pp. 27-28). 
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 Before beginning our analysis of Veblen’s theory of capitalistic stagnation, we must first 
examine his thoughts on the business cycle for any information that may help us understand his 
analysis of stagnation.   
 Veblen attributes the business cycle to the use of loan credit.  He writes: 
An industrial crisis is a period of liquidation, cancelment of credits, high discount rates, 
falling prices and "forced sales," and shrinkage of values. It has as a sequel, both severe 
and lasting, a shrinkage of capitalization throughout the field affected by it. It leaves the 
business men collectively poorer, in terms of money value; but the property which they 
hold between them may not be appreciably smaller in point of physical magnitude or of 
mechanical efficiency than it was before the liquidation set in. It commonly also involves 
an appreciable curtailment of industry, more severe than lasting; but the effects which a 
crisis has in industry proper are commonly not commensurate with its consequences in 
business or with the importance attached to a crisis by the business community (Veblen, 
1904, pp. 190-192). 
 
Whereas Classical economists attribute depressions to the hand of God, Veblen explained 
depressions are of necessity tied to the mechanisms of a capitalistic society and that the “immediate 
occasion of such a crisis, then, is that there arises a practical discrepancy between the earlier 
effective capitalization on which the collateral has been accepted by the creditors, and the 
subsequent effective capitalization of the same collateral shown by quotations and sales of the 
securities on the market” (Veblen, 1904, p. 193). 
 Put in other terms, Veblen was of the opinion that depressions are “a malady of the 
affections. The discrepancy which discourages business men is a discrepancy between that 
nominal capitalization which they have set their hearts upon through habituation in the immediate 
past and that actual capitalizable value of their property which its current earning−capacity will 
warrant” (Veblen, 1904, p. 237). 
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 Veblen held the belief that crises and depressions do not destroy the material wealth of a 
community, rather, only the income of the businessman.   
Under the old order, industry, and even such trade as there was, was a quest of livelihood; 
under the new order industry is directed by the quest of profits. Formerly, therefore, times 
were good or bad according as the industrial processes yielded a sufficient or an insufficient 
output of the means of life. Latterly times are good or bad according as the process of 
business yields an adequate or inadequate rate of profits. The controlling end is different 
in the present, and the question of welfare turns on the degree of success with which this 
different ulterior end is achieved. Prosperity now means, primarily, business prosperity; 
whereas it used to mean industrial sufficiency (Veblen, 1904, p. 178). 
 
 John Maynard Keynes in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money once said in reference to the business cycle and full employment: “I doubt that, except 
during war (World War I), we have had any recent experience of a boom so strong that it led to 
full employment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 322). 
 Thirty years before this statement by Keynes, Veblen had some similarly interesting 
remarks: 
It might even be a tenable generalization, though perhaps unnecessarily broad, to say that 
for a couple of decades past the normal condition of industrial business has been a mild but 
chronic state of depression, and that any marked departure from commonplace dull times 
has attracted attention as a particular case calling for a particular explanation (Veblen, 
1904, p. 184). 
 
 Before proceeding to the examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation, we turn to Joseph 
Dorfman to summarize Veblen’s theory of the business cycle. 
The scope and method of modern industry are given by the machine.  The machine process 
implies and enforces a sweeping standardization of processes, goods, services, and 
consumers.  Mankind, in order to get along with the machine process and reap the benefits 
of its efficiency, must adapt itself to its impersonal, standardized requirements.  The 
machine process denotes a reasoned procedure as against the rule of thumb of the 
traditional scheme of control, where personal propensity is the dominant feature and where 
the industrial processes and material procedures must adapt themselves to the needs of the 
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big businessman.  Advance in industrial efficiency is due to the comprehensive, 
concatenated character of the entire process, and the economic welfare of the community 
is best served by a facile and uninterrupted inter-play of its various parts. 
But the greater gains of the modern captain are made in disturbing the delicate interstitial 
adjustments between plants and processes.  Great profits are achieved not from productive 
efficiency, but from the shifts in the distribution of ownership in vendible capital or 
securities.  The modern captain is interested not in the permanent efficiency of the 
industrial system or of any plant, but in the control of a segment of the system for the 
strategic purpose of influencing the security market for the flotation of securities, the 
maneuvering of a coalition or any other well-known method of manipulation.  The results 
of his maneuvering and strategic activity is a chronic perturbation of industry, which has 
become the normal state of affairs.  The modern captain does not create opportunities for 
increasing industrial efficiency, but only watches for opportunities to put his competitors 
in an uncomfortable position; cut-throat competition, rate wars, duplication, misdirection, 
wasted efforts, and even delay of improvements long after they are advisable are the price 
the community pays.  When the game between competing business interests is played to a 
finish, in a coalition of the competitors under single management, then it may proceed more 
obviously as a conflict between the monopoly and the community.  By virtue of the delicate 
character of the industrial process as a while, a small apparent disturbance by the captains 
has a cumulative effect throughout the system far in excess of the original disturbance and 
is typified by such phenomena as crises and depressions. (Dorfman, 1947, pp. 225-226) 
 
 With our conclusion of Veblen’s theory of the business cycle, we can now resume our 
examination of Veblen’s theory of stagnation of the capitalistic society.   
 The Classical and Marxian economists, in the previous chapters, were shown to have very 
pessimistic views of the stationary state.  However, for a truly dismal picture of a capitalistic 
society, you must look at the works of Veblen in which he discusses capitalistic stagnation.  
Veblen’s discussion of stagnation takes two directions.  The first is in the direction of a changed 
social situation and more equitable utilization of resources that are derived from the machine 
process.  The second direction is one of a revision to barbarism, militarism, and patriotism.   
 Veblen develops two differing views of stagnation in his writings.  In The Theory of 
Business Enterprise, he has hopes for the future; however, in Absentee Ownership his view is 
completely gloomy.  In an effort to see these distinctions in Veblen’s thinking, it is necessary to 
21 
 
examine the two books separately.  First, we will examine stagnation references in The Theory of 
Business Enterprise and then turn our attention to Absentee Ownership.   
 The Classical economists viewed stagnation as an end in itself, and the Marxian economists 
conceived capitalistic stagnation as a phase leading to the overthrow of the system completely by 
the revolt of the proletariat.  Keynesian economists, as we will see later, believe stagnation will be 
staved off by the government’s manipulation of the money markets and through nationalization of 
national industries.  Veblen, however, sees stagnation leading either to a total discontinuation of 
capitalism or to a maintenance of the status quo through ‘force and fraud.’ 
 Veblen believed stagnation would arise in a capitalistic society due to the business cycle 
and the perfection of competition, as well as from nationalism and the status system, “under the 
regime of a perfected machine industry and perfect business organization, with active competition 
throughout, it is at least probable that depression would not be seriously interrupted by any other 
cause.” (Veblen, 1904, p. 245) 
 Veblen also maintained that stagnation will be the result a ‘conscientious withdrawal of 
productive efficiency’ in a machine civilization. 
Depression and industrial stagnation follow only in case the pecuniary exigencies of the 
situation are of such a character as to affect the traffic of the business community in an 
inhibitory way. But business is the quest of profits, and an inhibition of this quest must 
touch the seat of its vital motives. Industrial depression means that the business men 
engaged do not see their way to derive a satisfactory gain from letting the industrial process 
go forward on the lines and in the volume for which the material equipment of industry is 
designed. It is not worth their while, and it might even work them pecuniary harm. 
Commonly their apprehension of the discrepancy which forbids an aggressive pursuit of 
industrial business is expressed by the phrase "overproduction." An alternative phrase, 
intended to cover the same concept, but less frequently employed, is ‘underconsumption.’ 
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 213-214) 
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 We have pointed out that Veblen saw capitalistic society doomed for stagnation due to the 
following cultural lags: the business cycle, the conscientious withdrawal of productive efficiency, 
and from the devotion to the imbecile institutions of government, church, national sentiments, and 
education.  
 So, does Veblen see any escape from this dilemma of stagnation?  Veblen sees it prevented 
by either of these two methods:  a more equitable distribution of the goods of society, or a reversion 
to militarism.   
The largest and most promising factor of cultural discipline − most promising as a 
corrective of iconoclastic vagaries − over which business principles rule is national politics.  
The purposes and the material effects of business politics have already been spoken of 
above, but in the present connection their incidental, disciplinary effects are no less 
important. Business interests urge an aggressive national policy and business men direct it. 
Such a policy is warlike as well as patriotic. The direct cultural value of a warlike business 
policy is unequivocal. It makes for a conservative animus on the part of the populace. 
During war time, and within the military organization at all times, under martial law, civil 
rights are in abeyance; and the more warfare and armament the more abeyance. Military 
training is a training in ceremonial precedence, arbitrary command, and unquestioning 
obedience. A military organization is essentially a servile organization. Insubordination is 
the deadly sin. The more consistent and the more comprehensive this military training, the 
more effectually will the members of the community be trained into habits of subordination 
and away from that growing propensity to make light of personal authority that is the chief 
infirmity of democracy. This applies first and most decidedly, of course, to the soldiery, 
but it applies only in a less degree to the rest of the population. They learn to think in 
warlike terms of rank, authority, and subordination, and so grow progressively more patient 
of encroachments upon their civil rights. 
…Warlike and patriotic preoccupations fortify the barbarian virtues of subordination and 
prescriptive authority. Habituation to a warlike, predatory scheme of life is the strongest 
disciplinary factor that can be brought to counteract the vulgarization of modern life 
wrought by peaceful industry and the machine process, and to rehabilitate the decaying 
sense of status and differential dignity. 
In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for "social unrest" and similar 
disorders of civilized life. There can, indeed, be no serious question but that a consistent 
return to the ancient virtues of allegiance, piety, servility, graded dignity, class prerogative, 
and prescriptive authority would greatly conduce to popular content and to the facie 
management of affairs. Such is the promise held out by a strenuous national policy. 
(Veblen, 1904, pp. 392-393) 
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Veblen was of the belief that a return to ‘the old virtues’ of militarism and a strenuous 
national policy would prevent stagnation; however, even in this dismal passage he takes heart and 
states: 
It is difficult to believe that the machine technology and the pursuit of the material sciences 
will be definitively superseded, for the reason, among others, that any community which 
loses these elements of its culture thereby loses that brute material force that gives it 
strength against its rivals. (Veblen, 1904, p. 400) 
 
 The preceding passages that appeared in 1904 proved Veblen’s doubts as to the lasting 
qualities of a capitalistic society that employed the machine process merely as an aid to increasing 
its income, but in 1923, these were his sentiments: 
…With every further move along the lines on which the industrial arts are advancing, 
therefore, sabotage – that is to say the strategic unemployment at the instance of the owner-
employer or of the workmen – becomes a swifter and more widely corrosive agency of 
miscarriage and decay. 
At the same time, and in great part by help of these same technical appliances and powers, 
the business community is able, also in a progressive fashion to bring sound conservative 
business principles to bear on industry in a swifter and more comprehensive way and with 
a slighter margin of error.  That is to say novelties will be disallowed with a freer hand and 
the tactical maneuvers of unemployment will gain something in frequency and amplitude; 
measures to suppress or disable the organization of workmen and malcontent will take on 
added scope, assurance, vigor, and dispatch. (Veblen, 1924, p. 421) 
 
 Once more in Absentee Ownership Veblen states, “It is conceivable that the civilized 
peoples might yet save themselves alive out of this impasse of their addiction to business, if it were 
not for their national integrity.” (Veblen, 1924, p. 422) 
Uncritical devotion to the national pretensions being a meritorious habit, it is also a useful 
article of camouflage, a shelter for gainful enterprises and transactions which might otherwise be 
open to doubt, a means of avoiding unfavorable notice of procuring a profitable line of good will. 
(Veblen, 1924, p. 427) 
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Veblen finishes Absentee Ownership with the following words in reference to capitalistic 
stagnation: 
The outlook should accordingly be that the businesslike control of the industrial system in 
detail should presently reach, if it has not already reached, and should speedily pass beyond 
that critical point of chronic derangement in the aggregate beyond which a continued 
pursuit of the same strategy on the same businesslike principles will result in a 
progressively widening margin of deficiency in the aggregate material output and a 
progressive shrinkage of the available means of life. (Veblen, 19224, p. 445) 
 
 In other words, capitalistic society will end either in a more equitable distribution of the 
goods of society or in a militaristic state as a result of stagnation.  Finally, we can look the 
following passage from Veblen to summarize: 
It seems possible to say this much, that the full dominion of business enterprise is 
necessarily a transitory dominion. It stands to lose in the end whether the one or the other 
of the two divergent cultural tendencies wins, because it is incompatible with the 
ascendancy of either. (Veblen, 1904, p. 400) 
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Chapter Five: Keynes on Stagnation 
 
 As discussed in previous chapters, Classical, Marxian, and Institutional economists all saw 
the future of capitalistic civilization as one of stagnation.  John Stuart Mill and his followers were 
of the opinion that this state of stagnation would be reached in a highly advanced civilization (Mill 
746-751).  Marx and his followers considered this state of stagnation merely as a phase of the 
dialectical movement leading to a classless society.  Veblen saw capitalistic society doomed for 
stagnation due to cultural lags such as the business cycle, the conscientious withdrawal of 
productive efficiency, and from the devotion to the imbecile institutions of government, church, 
national sentiments, and education. 
 John Maynard Keynes in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money, attempted to discover methods by which capitalistic society might be saved from 
unemployment, depression, and eventual stagnation.  In this chapter, we will examine Keynes’ 
writing in order to point out certain postulates of the Keynesian system that will lead to capitalistic 
stagnation.   
 The theory of stagnation that arises from the doctrines of the Keynesian system can be 
viewed through two separate vantage points.  The first is the marginal efficiency of capital and the 
rate of interest.  Keynes on the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest: 
I define the marginal efficiency as being equal to the rate of discount which would make 
the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capital-
assets during its life just equal to its supply price.  This gives it the marginal efficiencies 
of particular types of capital-assets.  The greatest of these marginal efficiencies can then 
be regarded as the marginal efficiency of capital in general (Keynes, 1936, pp. 135-136). 
 
The rate of interest is in itself nothing more than the inverse proportion between a sum of 
money and what can be obtained for parting with control over the money in exchange for 
a debt for a stated period of time (Keynes, 1936, p. 167). 
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 The second vantage point from which we can view the theory of stagnation is the liquidity 
preference and the propensity to consume.  Keynes also takes the liberty of defining these concepts 
for us: 
Liquidity-preference is a potentiality of functional tendency, which fixes the quantity of 
money which the public will hold when the rate of interest is given so that if r is the rate of 
interest, M the quantity of money and L the function of liquidity preference, we have M = 
L (r) (Keynes, 1936, p. 168). 
 
We shall define the propensity to consume as the functional relationship X between Yw as 
a given level of income in terms of wage-units, and Cw the expenditure on consumption 
out of that level of income so that: Cw = X(Yw) or C = W. X(Yw) (Keynes, 1936, p. 90). 
 
 Keynesian economics emerged as an attempt to solve the numerous problems facing 
society in the days of the Great Depression of 1929-1939.  Keynes’ writings were revolutionary in 
his approach to economic problems.   
 Keynes believed that full employment might be reached by widening the gap between the 
marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest.  As evidenced by the following passage, 
Keynes believed that interest was a reward for not hoarding which is in contrast to Classical 
economists who believed interest was a reward for saving. 
It is to our best advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the schedule 
of the marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment. There can be no 
doubt that this criterion will lead to a much lower rate of interest than has ruled hitherto; 
and, so far as one can guess at the schedules of the marginal efficiency of capital 
corresponding to increasing amounts of capital, the rate of interest is likely to fall steadily, 
if it should be practicable to maintain conditions of more or less continuous full 
employment—unless, indeed, there is an excessive change in the aggregate propensity to 
consume (including the State).  
I feel sure that the demand for capital is strictly limited in the sense that it would not be 
difficult to increase the stock of capital up to a point where its marginal efficiency had 
fallen to a very low figure. This would not mean that the use of capital instruments would 
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cost almost nothing, but only that the return from them would have to cover little more 
than their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk 
and the exercise of skill and judgment. In short, the aggregate return from durable goods 
in the course of their life would, as in the case of short-lived goods, just cover their labour-
costs of production plus an allowance for risk and the costs of skill and supervision.  
Now, though this state of affairs would be quite compatible with some measure of 
individualism, yet it would mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the 
euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value 
of capital. Interest to-day rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land. 
The owner of capital can obtain interest because capital is scarce, just as the owner of land 
can obtain rent because land is scarce (Keynes, 1936, pp. 375-376). 
 
 The preceding quotation does not provide the entire reasoning behind Keynes’ belief that 
full employment may be reached by lowering the rate of interest.  The following quotation, 
however, may clear things up: 
If there is some tendency to a measure of long-run uniformity in the state of liquidity-
preference, there may well be some sort of rough relationship between the national income 
and the quantity of money required to satisfy liquidity-preference, taken as a mean over 
periods of pessimism and optimism together. There may be, for example, some fairly stable 
proportion of the national income more than which people will not readily keep in the shape 
of idle balances for long periods together, provided the rate of interest exceeds a certain 
psychological minimum; so that if the quantity of money beyond what is required in the 
active circulation is in excess of this proportion of the national income, there will be a 
tendency sooner or later for the rate of interest to fall to the neighbourhood of this 
minimum. The falling rate of interest will then, cet. par., increase effective demand, and 
the increasing effective demand will reach one or more of the semi-critical points at which 
the wage-unit will tend to show a discontinuous rise, with a corresponding effect on prices 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 306-307). 
 
 The gap that can be made to exist between the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency 
of capital may be manipulated by the government, according to Keynes.  This is executed in order 
to deliver full employment and a high propensity to consume, which will in turn solve the problem 
of secular stagnation.   
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 With the constant lowering of the rate of interest, the zero gap is created between the rate 
of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital which will stimulate investment and lead to full 
employment.  However, it seems that this type of action will lead to a reduction in the marginal 
efficiency of capital to zero.  If that happens as a result of lowering the rate of interest to zero, has 
the problem of secular stagnation been removed or only postponed for a brief period of time? 
 Keynes expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of this solution to stagnation and 
unemployment in these words, “Thus even if the rate of interest is zero, there is a strict limit to the 
proportion of prospective consumers’ demand which it is profitable to begin providing for in 
advance” (Keynes, 1936, pp. 217). 
 Keynes went on to state in his General Theory that monetary policy alone is not always 
enough to remedy an economic downturn or stagnation.  This has been used as an argument for 
deficit spending as an answer for secular stagnation. 
For my own part I am now somewhat skeptical of the success of a merely monetary policy 
directed towards influencing the rate of interest. I expect to see the State, which is in a 
position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the 
basis of the general social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for directly 
organizing investment; since it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation 
of the marginal efficiency of different types of capital, calculated on the principles I have 
described above, will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of 
interest (Keynes, 1936, p. 164). 
 
 Now that we have shown that the theory of stagnation is inherently a part of Keynes’ theory 
of monetary manipulation, we can shift our attention to the discrepancy between the propensity to 
consume and the propensity to save and their relation to the theory of secular stagnation.   
 In his General Theory, Keynes lists the following objective factors influencing the 
propensity to consume: 
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1. A change in the wage units. 
2. A change in the difference between income and net income. 
3. Windfall changes in capital-values not allowed for in calculating net income. 
4. Changes in the rate of time-discounting. 
5. Changes in fiscal policy. 
6. Changes in expectations of the relation between the present and the future level 
of income (Keynes, 1936, pp. 91-95). 
 
Considering these factors influencing the propensity to consume, Keynes concluded, “In a 
given situation the propensity to consume may be considered a fairly stable function, provided that 
we have eliminated changes in the wage-unit in terms of money” (Keynes, 1936, p. 95). 
 The propensity to consume is one of the factors that contributes to employment and to the 
full utilization of economic resources; therefore, if the propensity to consume remains stable or 
tends to fall there will be a tendency for the economy to have less than full employment and the 
economy will eventually stagnate.  Keynes concluded from his examination of the trend in the 
propensity to consume and the propensity to save that,  
…there has been a chronic tendency throughout human history for the propensity to save 
to be stronger than the inducement to invest. The weakness of the inducement to invest has 
been at all times the key to the economic problem. Today the explanation of the weakness 
of this inducement may chiefly lie in the extent of existing accumulations; whereas, 
formerly, risks and hazards of all kinds may have played a larger part. But the result is the 
same. The desire of, the individual to augment his personal wealth by abstaining from 
consumption has usually been stronger than the inducement to the entrepreneur to augment 
the national wealth by employing labour on the construction of durable assets (Keynes, 
1936, pp. 347-348). 
 
If the propensity to consume and the propensity to save are factors in full employment and 
the development of the economic system, and there is a tendency for saving to exceed 
consumption, what had prevented stagnation up to the point where Keynes wrote his General 
Theory?  Keynes answered that in the following way: 
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… the frequency of war over the average of (say) each decade seems to have been 
sufficient, taken in conjunction with the propensity to consume, to establish a schedule of 
the marginal efficiency of capital which allowed a reasonably satisfactory average level of 
employment to be compatible with a rate of interest high enough to be psychologically 
acceptable to wealth-owners (Keynes, 1936, p. 307). 
 
 Keynes again stated that because of the discrepancy of the propensity to consume and the 
propensity to save he doubted if, “except during the war (World War I) we have had any recent 
experiences of a boom so strong that it led to full employment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 322). 
 In conclusion, our study of Keynes has shown that society will be driven into stagnation 
by discrepancy in the propensity to consume and the propensity to save.  We also examined the 
relationship of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest and revealed that the 
government manipulation of the rate of interest may postpone stagnation for a time.  However, the 
marginal efficiency of capital tends to fall to zero, and this in turn will lead capitalistic society into 
stagnation. 
 As we will see in the next chapter, economists from Harvard University and other schools 
used the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money during the ‘Keynesian Revolution’ 
as a basis for their theories of ‘The Matured Economy’.  We will mostly focus on the ideas of the 
American economist, Alvin Hansen. 
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Chapter Six: Alvin Hansen and the Matured Economy 
 
 The theories of ‘The Matured Economy’ were first introduced during the Keynesian 
Revolution by various economists.  We must first examine the theory and explain the basic 
postulates of the matured economy.  Here are the basic postulates of the theory of the matured 
economy: 
1. The declining rate of population.  The decline in the birth rate according to these 
economists, including Alvin Hansen, means that the entrepreneur cannot find enough 
places in which to invest his money profitably.  In turn, the economy becomes stagnant 
and unemployment rises. 
2. The disappearance of the frontiers, with the consequential loss of investment 
opportunities.  When there is no more land to explore or expand to, stagnation will set 
in.   
3. The lack of new industries that will create jobs and investment opportunities.  
Economic growth will slow due to the lack of new business and jobs, also leading to 
higher unemployment (Hansen, 1938). 
These were the three reasons that would ultimately lead to secular stagnation in the 
economy.  Paul Sweezy summarizes Hansen’s stagnation theory: 
According to this theory, the modern developed capitalist economy has an enormous 
capacity to save, both because of its corporate structure and because of the very unequal 
distribution of personal income.  But if adequate profitable investment opportunities are 
lacking, this saving potential translates not into real capital formation and sustained growth 
but into lowered income, mass unemployment, and chronic depression, a condition 
summed up in the term stagnation (Sweezy, 1982, p. 53). 
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In a presentation given by Alvin Hansen in 1939, he was attempting to draw a contrast 
between a cyclical period of slow growth and a structural change in the economy.  Hansen was of 
the mindset that the world at that time was not experiencing a normal downturn in the business 
cycle, but rather, we were entering a new era of much slower growth.  He stated, “We are passing, 
so to speak, over a divide which separates the great era of growth and expansion of the nineteenth 
century from an era which no man, unwilling to embark on pure conjecture, can yet characterize 
with clarity or precision.”  The Great Depression, in the eyes of Hansen, was something that might 
last indefinitely because of structural changes (Hansen, 1939). 
The first part of Hansen’s theory we will look at is the idea of declining population growth.  
He believed the slower population growth would lead to slower economic growth.  Here are 
Hansen’s thoughts on the effect of population growth: 
Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining 
the character of the output; in other words, the com- position of the flow of final goods. 
Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new 
residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population 
with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and 
the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of 
capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand 
for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is 
therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or 
declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the 
ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline (Hansen, 1939, p. 7). 
 
Hansen believed that economists should resort to the ideas of Adam Smith on population 
growth as opposed to the more pessimistic views of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo.  Smith 
thought population growth led to further growth and expansion.  Ricardo and Malthus believed 
that rapid population growth would likely lead to the stagnation of the capitalistic society.   
Adam Smith regarded growth of population as at once a consequence and a cause of 
economic progress. Increasing division of labor would, he argued, bring about greater 
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productivity, and this would furnish an enlarged revenue and stock, from which would flow 
an enlarged wages fund, an increased demand for labor, higher wages, and so economic 
conditions favorable for population growth. Now a growing population, by widening the 
market and by fostering inventiveness, in turn facilitated, he thought, division of labor and 
so the production of wealth. Thus he arrived at an optimistic conclusion. Population 
growth, he held, stimulated progress and this in turn stimulated further growth and 
expansion. In contrast, the pessimistic analyses of Malthus and Ricardo stressed the 
limitation of natural resources and the danger of an increasing population's pressing down 
the margin of cultivation to a point at which real income would be reduced to a bare 
subsistence level. In this static analysis the more dynamic approach of Adam Smith was 
quite forgotten. If we wish to get a clear insight into the economic consequences of the 
current decline in population growth, it is necessary to return to the suggestion of Adam 
Smith and to explore more fully the causal inter- connection between economic progress, 
capital formation and population growth (Hansen, 1939, pp. 2-3). 
 
Hansen believed that a considerable amount of economic growth could be attributed to the 
expansion to the western frontier.  The development of new territories was certainly intertwined 
with population growth.  A big proportion of capital formation in the United States went into the 
western frontier in the nineteenth century.   Hansen concluded that, “the opening of new territory 
and the growth of population were together responsible for a very large fraction-possibly 
somewhere near one-half-of the total volume of new capital formation in the nineteenth century” 
(Hansen, 1939, p. 9). 
Hansen revealed that outlets for further investment in new territories were rapidly 
diminishing.  One would have to look somewhere else for new investment opportunities.  Joseph 
Schumpeter, another American economist, labeled Hansen’s theory the “theory of vanishing 
investment opportunities” (Sweezy, 1982, p. 53). 
Hansen thought it was up to the progress of technology to lead bring full employment and 
more private investment.  But would it be enough to offset the declining growth in population 
which hurts economic growth?  Hansen wrote,  
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Thus the outlets for new investment are rapidly narrowing down to those created by the 
progress of technology.  To be sure, the progress of technology itself played in the 
nineteenth century a decisive role in the opening of new territory and as a stimulus to 
population growth. But while technology can facilitate the opening of new territory, it 
cannot create a new world or make the old one bigger than it is. And while the advance of 
science, by reducing the death rate, was a major cause of the vast nineteenth-century 
increase in population, no important further gains in this direction can possibly offset the 
prevailing low birth rate. Thus the further progress of science can operate to open 
investment outlets only through its direct influence on the technique of production (Hansen, 
1939, pp. 9-10). 
 
Hansen said there was no greater mistake in the analysis of economic trends than those 
which finds that the advance of technology was a major cause of unemployment.  He said that you 
cannot discount the problem of technological unemployment which may be intensified as the 
importance of capital-saving increases.  However, you cannot disregard the type of innovations 
that lead to new industries and which thereby creates new outlets for investment.  Hansen said, 
“What we need is not a slowing down in the progress of science and technology, but rather an 
acceleration of that rate” (Hansen, 1939, p. 10). 
The most important thing for the economy, according to Hansen, is the development of 
new industries.  With the decreasing expansion into new frontiers, it was up to technological 
advancements to fill the void.  New industries such as railroads and the automobile, contributed 
greatly to economic growth.  Also contributing to the growth was the construction of public roads 
for these new automobiles.  When these industries mature, however, new industries must emerge 
to continue economic growth or the economy will inevitably stagnate.   
And when a revolutionary new industry like the railroad or the automobile, after having 
initiated in its youth a powerful upwards urge of investment activity, reaches maturity and 
ceases to grow, as all industries finally must, the whole economy must experience a pro- 
found stagnation, unless indeed new developments take its place. It is not enough that a 
mature industry continues its activity at a high level on a horizontal plane (Hansen, 1939, 
pp. 10-11). 
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Hansen said, “It is the cessation of growth which is disastrous.”  After strong periods of 
growth from particular industries, they will mature and growth will slow.  When giant new 
industries have spent their force, it can take a long time for something of equal magnitude to 
emerge.  Hansen pointed out that this phenomenon was taking place in the 1930s as no new 
industries were emerging (Hansen, 1939, p. 11). 
It was that failure of new industries emerging that was causing the slow or negative 
economic growth along with unemployment.   
But a full-fledged recovery calls for something more than the mere expenditure of 
depreciation allowances. It requires a large outlay on new investment, and this awaits the 
development of great new industries and new techniques.  But such new developments are 
not currently available in adequate volume. It is my growing conviction that the combined 
effect of the decline in population growth, together with the failure of any really important 
innovations of a magnitude sufficient to absorb large capital outlays, weighs very heavily 
as an explanation for the failure of the recent recovery to reach full employment (Hansen, 
1939, p. 11). 
 
In the absence of adequate technological progress, what policies could be used in order to 
stave off stagnation and maintain full employment?  Hansen had a few different ideas, which are 
generally agreed upon among Keynesian economists.  Hansen believed that lowering the rate of 
taxes on workers could strengthen consumption by directing more of their income towards 
consumption rather to the government.  Public investment is another tactic that can be used to 
combat unemployment and slowing growth.  Investments made in human and natural resources 
and in consumers’ capital goods will serve the physical, recreational, and cultural needs of 
community as a whole.  Hansen warned that such programs, whether financed by taxation or 
borrowing, may adversely affect the system of free enterprise.   
Can a rising public debt owned internally be serviced by a scheme of taxation which will 
not adversely affect the marginal return on new investment or the marginal cost of 
borrowing? Can any tax system, designed to increase the propensity to consume by means 
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of a drastic change in income distribution, be devised which will not progressively 
encroach on private investment? (Hansen, 1939, p. 12). 
 
Public spending is the easiest of all recovery methods, and therein lies its danger. If it is 
carried too far, we neglect to attack those specific maladjustments without the removal of 
which we cannot attain a workable cost-price structure, and therefore we fail to achieve the 
otherwise available flow of private investment (Hansen, 1939, p. 14). 
 
 Hansen admitted that this problem of secular stagnation was quite difficult and there were 
no definitive solutions.  He said, “There are no easy answers to the problems that confront us.  And 
because this is true, economists will not perform their function if they fail to illustrate the rapidly 
shifting course of economic development, and through such neglect unwittingly contribute to a 
dangerous lag in adjustments to change.”   
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Chapter Seven: Current Debate on Secular Stagnation 
 
 In November 2013, Lawrence Summers, former Treasury Secretary, delivered a speech to 
the International Monetary Fund at a conference dedicated to crises of yesterday and today.  In his 
speech, Summers revived the idea of secular stagnation.  Secular stagnation had not been talked 
about in mainstream economic circles in decades.  Since the conference, Summers has expanded 
on this idea through other speeches and various opinion pieces in publications.  Some economists 
have come to his defense and others have criticized his outlook. 
Lawrence Summers on Secular Stagnation 
 
 Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the recovery has been fairly weak with slow 
economic growth and an unemployment rate that has only recently fallen to near normal levels.  
During the current recovery, real GDP growth for the six years following the end of the recession 
in 2009 has only averaged 2.02% quarterly.  The rate of growth during recoveries or non-recession 
periods has steadily declined over the past thirty years.  The recession of 1981-82 was followed 
by a six-year average real GDP growth of 4.56%.  The recovery after the 1990-91 recession seen 
an average of 3.02% real GDP growth from 1991-1997.  The recovery following the tech boom of 
the late 1990s had an average of 2.70% real GDP growth rate for six years following the end of 
the recession in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) There is a downward trend for 
economic growth post-recovery over the past three decades.  The 1981-82 recession is the best 
comparison to the most recent recession since the decline in GDP is similar and unemployment 
reached nearly 11%.  Growth following the 1981-82 recession far outpaced our current recovery. 
 Aside from economic growth, employment statistics have been difficult to get back to 
normal levels.  The unemployment rate is now around 5% but other employment statistics such as 
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the employment-population ratio are still high.  That number stands below 60%, which means over 
40% of the population is not working.  Before the downturn, the ratio stood above 63%. (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
These factors caused Lawrence Summers and others to invoke the theory of secular 
stagnation once again.  Summers raised the idea that, “the American and global economies could 
not rely on normal market mechanisms to assure full employment and strong growth without 
sustained unconventional policy support.”  His worries stemmed from a few different items.  First, 
despite financial repair largely taking place five years ago, the recovery has only kept up with 
population growth and normal productivity growth in the United States.  It’s even worse in other 
industrialized countries.  Second, unsustainable bubbles and loose credit standards seemed to only 
create moderate economic growth.  Third, short-term interest rates are severely constrained by zero 
lower bound and there is little room for further reduction which means real interest rates may not 
be able to fall far enough to spur enough investment to lead to full employment.  Fourth, in this 
type of situation falling wages and prices or inflation that is below expectations is likely to worsen 
economic performance by encouraging consumers and investors to delay spending and to 
redistribute income and wealth from higher spending debtors to lower spending creditors 
(Summers, 2013). 
 At a policy conference for the National Association for Business Economics, Summers 
posed the question, “Can we identify any sustained stretch during which the economy grew 
satisfactorily with conditions that were financially sustainable?”  Summers looked at various 
economic indicators during the recovery and revealed that the recovery itself was very weak as 
compared to past recoveries, which tended to be quite strong.   
39 
 
The record of growth for the last five years is disturbing, but I think that is not the whole 
of what should concern us. It is true that prior to the downturn in 2007, through the period 
from, say, 2002 until 2007, the economy grew at a satisfactory rate. Note that, there is no 
clear evidence of overheating. Inflation did not accelerate in any substantial way. But the 
economy did grow at a satisfactory rate, and did certainly achieve satisfactory levels of 
capacity utilization and employment.  
Did it do so in a sustainable way? I would suggest not. It is now clear that the increase in 
house prices was associated with an unsustainable upward movement in the share of GDP 
devoted to residential investment.  And this made possible a substantial increase in the 
debt-to-income ratio for households, which has been reversed only to a limited extent.  
It is fair to say that critiques of macroeconomic policy during this period, almost without 
exception, suggest that prudential policy was insufficiently prudent, that fiscal policy was 
excessively expansive, and that monetary policy was excessively loose (Summers, 2014, 
pp. 66-67). 
 
 Summers goes onto to explain in speech at the NABE policy conference that the data is not 
kind to industrial countries over the last fifteen years.  The future does not look bright for those 
countries to maintain full employment and sustain growth. 
In sum, I would suggest to you that the record of industrial countries over the last 15 years 
is profoundly discouraging as to the prospect of maintaining substantial growth with 
financial stability. Why is this the case? I would suggest that in understanding this 
phenomenon, it is useful at the outset to consider the possibility that changes in the structure 
of the economy have led to a significant shift in the natural balance between savings and 
investment, causing a decline in the equilibrium or normal real rate of interest that is 
associated with full employment (Summers, 2014, p. 69). 
 
 Summers also speaks of the decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest.  He ponders if 
it is a plausible hypothesis currently: 
Let us imagine, as a hypothesis, that this decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest has 
taken place. What would one expect to see? One would expect increasing difficulty, 
particularly in the down phase of the cycle, in achieving full employment and strong growth 
because of the constraints associated with the zero lower bound on interest rates. One 
would expect that, as a normal matter, real interest rates would be lower. With very low 
real interest rates and with low inflation, this also means very low nominal interest rates, 
so one would expect increasing risk-seeking by investors.  As such, one would expect 
greater reliance on Ponzi finance and increased financial instability (Summers, 2014, p. 
69). 
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 There are six different reasons why Summers believes this hypothesis is reasonable for 
today’s situation.   
First he says is a decrease in demand for debt-financed investment.  He says it can mostly 
be attributed to the changing character of productive economic activity.  Capital investment is not 
as necessary as it once was in the past due to technological advances.  The reduced demand for 
investment will lead to changes for equilibrium levels of interest rates.  
Secondly, Summers invokes Alvin Hansen in relation to the declining rate of population 
growth.  The labor force of the United States will grow at a much slower pace the next two decades 
than it has over the last two decades.  
Third, changes in the distribution of income, both between labor income and capital income 
and between the wealthy and those with little wealth, have operated to raise the propensity to save, 
as have increases in corporate-retained earnings.  Reduced investment demand and an increased 
propensity to save work in the direction of a lower equilibrium real interest rate.  
Fourth, there has been a shift downward in the relative price of capital equipment.  The 
cheaper capital goods mean that investment goods can be completed with less borrowing which 
reduces the propensity for investment.   
Although Summers does not focus on this point too much, he says there is a legitimate 
argument that what matters in an economy is after-tax, rather than pre-tax, real interest rates, and 
the consequence of disinflation is that for any given after-tax real interest rate, the pretax real 
interest rate now needs to be lower than before.   
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Finally, there has been plenty of global moves to accumulate central bank reserves.  Most 
of those reserves are in the form of the safe assets, such as U.S. Treasuries.  Each of these factors 
has operated to reduce natural or equilibrium real interest rates (Summers, 2014, pp. 70-71). 
So if this view is accepted as reality, what are the possible responses according to 
Summers?  He gives us three responses: (1) Stay patient, (2) Reduce the real rate of interest, and 
(3) Raise demand (Summers, 2014, pp. 71-73). 
The response of being patient is one that Japan has followed for many years according to 
Summers.  He also states that the United States has essentially pursued this strategy for the last 
three or four years.  Policy has limited impact.  Summers says we are facing an inverse Say’s Law. 
Say’s Law is where supply creates its own demand but currently, we are observing that lack of 
demand creates its own lack of supply (Summers, p. 71). 
The second response Summers suggests is to reduce the actual rate of interest.  If the natural 
rate of interest has declined, then logically, it is appropriate to lower the actual rate of interest to 
permit adequate economic growth.  Summers believes this is a better response than no response; 
however, he is skeptical that rates that stay at or below zero for a substantial time could lead to 
financial bubbles.   
Finally, Summers believes that raising demand through fiscal policy is a proper response 
to secular stagnation.   
The preferable strategy, I would argue, is to raise the level of demand at any given rate of 
interest—raising the level of output consistent with an increased level of equilibrium rates 
and mitigating the various risks associated with low interest rates that I have described. 
How might that be done? It seems to me there are a variety of plausible approaches, and 
economists will differ on their relative efficacy. Anything that stimulates demand will 
operate in a positive direction from this perspective (Summers, 2014, pp. 72). 
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There is some criticism that expansionary fiscal policy may not be possible because the 
government cannot continue to expand its debt indefinitely.  Summers responds, “As long as a 
public investment yields a positive return it will generate enough revenue to service the associated 
debt.”  He also adds the effect will be magnified if there are any Keynesian fiscal stimulus effects 
of the project or if there are any hysteresis effects. The October 2014 IMF World Economic 
Outlook even suggests that public investments in countries where interest rates are near the zero 
lower bound are likely to significantly reduce debt-to-GDP ratios (Summers, 2015). 
 Ben Bernanke, a critic of Summers’ position on secular stagnation summarizes it quite well 
in an article from March 2015: 
Hansen proved quite wrong, of course, failing to anticipate the postwar economic boom 
(including both strong population growth—the baby boom—and rapid technological 
progress). However, Summers thinks that Hansen’s prediction was not wrong, just 
premature. For a number of reasons—including the contemporary decline in population 
growth, the reduced capital intensity of our leading industries (think Facebook versus steel-
making), and the falling relative prices of capital goods—Larry sees Hansen’s prediction 
of limited investment in new capital goods and an economy that chronically fails to reach 
full employment as relevant today. If the returns to capital today are very low, then the real 
interest rate needed to achieve full employment (the equilibrium real interest rate) will 
likely also be very low, possibly negative. The recent pattern of slow economic growth, 
low inflation, and low real interest rates motivates and is consistent with the secular 
stagnation hypothesis. 
Notice, by the way, that the secular stagnation story is about inadequate aggregate demand, 
not aggregate supply. Even if the economy’s potential output is growing, the Hansen-
Summers hypothesis holds that depressed investment and consumption spending will 
prevent the economy from reaching that potential, except perhaps when a financial bubble 
(like the housing bubble of the 2000s) provides an additional push to spending. However, 
Summers argues that secular stagnation will ultimately reduce aggregate supply as well, as 
growth in the economy’s productive capacity is restrained by slow rates of capital 
formation and by the loss of workers’ skills caused by long-term unemployment (Bernanke, 
2015). 
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Bernanke’s Response to Summers 
 
 The main opponent of Lawrence Summers on the topic of secular stagnation was Ben 
Bernanke.  The two economists exchanged ideas back forth through a series of blog posts.  
Bernanke had doubts if secular stagnation is actually taking place and what the proper solutions 
are if we are experiencing it.   
 Bernanke denies that the United States currently faces secular stagnation for a few different 
reasons, which goes beyond the fact that the U.S. economy is on its way to full employment.  First, 
he states that if real interest rates are consistently as low as negative 2 percent it is hard to believe 
that there would be a permanent lack of profitable investment opportunities.  As Paul Samuelson 
once taught him, if real interest rates were expected to be negative indefinitely, almost any 
investment is profitable.  Therefore, it is hard to imagine that the real rate can be negative for an 
extended period. 
 Second, Bernanke agrees with another recent critique of secular stagnation by Jim 
Hamilton, Ethan Harris, Jan Hatzius, and Kenneth West.  They have reservations with Summers’ 
claim that we have not experienced full employment during the past several decades without the 
presence of a financial bubble.  They reveal that the bubble in tech stocks came very late in the 
boom of the 1990s, and they also provide estimates to show the positive effects of the housing 
bubble of the 2000s on consumer demand were largely offset by other special factors, including 
the negative effects of the dramatic increase in world oil prices and the drain on demand created 
by a trade deficit equal to six percent of U.S. output.  The economists argue that the slow economic 
growth and higher unemployment is not likely due to secular stagnation.  Rather, it is due to 
temporary “headwinds” that are already in the process of dissipating.  Bernanke, during his time 
as Fed chairman frequently spoke of these “headwinds” arising from the aftermath of the financial 
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crisis on credit conditions.  The slow recovery of housing and restrictive fiscal policies at both the 
federal, state, and local levels also played a part. 
 Finally, Bernanke’s biggest gripe with Summers’ analysis is the lack of attention to the 
international dimension.  Summers mostly focuses on factors affecting domestic capital investment 
and household spending.  Bernanke, however, has said that all else equal, the availability of 
profitable capital investments throughout the rest of the world should help defeat secular stagnation 
back in the United States.  Bernanke explains, “The foreign exchange value of the dollar is one 
channel through which this could work: If U.S. households and firms invest abroad, the resulting 
outflows of financial capital would be expected to weaken the dollar, which in turn would promote 
U.S. exports.”  The increased exports would then raise production and employment in the United 
States, helping the economy reach full employment.  Therefore, in an open economy, secular 
stagnation requires that returns to capital investment must be permanently low everywhere, not 
just in the home economy (Bernanke, 2015). 
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A Failed Growth Economy 
 
 Economist Kent Kritgaard has a different take on the secular stagnation debate.  He 
believes that the growth-dominated view of economies is failing us.  Growth-dominated 
economies, including the United States, have three sets of limits.  First, the internal limits are found 
in the dynamics of capital accumulation, specifically referring to investment.  When these limits 
are reached, the economy will stagnate, either cyclically or long-term.  The second sets of limits 
are biophysical in nature.  The limit of peak oil and human effects on climate change.  This include 
mass extinction, acidification of the oceans, and the increasing ecological footprint across the 
board.  Lastly, we have the limits of the political process.  Post World War II brought on a growth 
coalition, whose political agenda required more and more economic growth to acquire more for 
their constituents.  As the capacity of growth lessens so does one’s ability to grow out of social 
dilemmas. (Kritgaard, 2010) 
 Kritgaard goes after mainstream Neoclassical and Keynesian views by explaining that they 
are unable to understand their own limits.  He states, “neither the neoclassical nor Keynesian 
varieties of mainstream economics are capable of analyzing adequately the historical conjecture 
off the internal and biophysical limits.  Instead, he says to look to ecological economics and 
understand that the mainstream view of growth held by both Lawrence Summers and Ben 
Bernanke is incorrect.  He summarizes: 
The time is coming when we must begin to transcend the mere critique of mainstream 
economics, and concentrate on building anew. The fundamental dilemma of the failed 
growth economy: that growth is simultaneously too fast and too slow, cannot be addressed 
adequately in the context of a set of institutional arrangements that rely on economic 
growth to meet basic human needs of employment and freedom from poverty. We must 
find theories that are consistent with the basic laws of science and do not sacrifice human 
dignity to a failed system in which a reduction in economic growth translates into 
stagnation and unemployment. One can find a hope for a sustainable future only in 
degrowth economics (Kritgaard, 2010) 
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 Kritgaard states that the idea that a material economy could continue to grow forever in a 
finite and non-growing biophysical environment is “absurd”.  He calls on a new set of theories to 
account for the rapidly approaching biophysical constraints since the mainstream theories lack this 
ability.   
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Chapter Eight: Concluding Remarks 
 
 The idea of a stagnant economy has been with us for centuries.  It started with the followers 
of Adam Smith in the Classical school.  The theories were developed from Thomas Malthus’ 
theory on population by John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo.  The Malthusian theory of population 
explained that food supply would be unable to keep up with population growth in the long-term.  
Both Mill and Ricardo also thought the Law of Diminishing Returns would also lead to stagnation.  
This law says that that as additional amounts of capital and labor are added to production past its 
optimum point, profits will continue to decrease until profit essentially falls to zero.  Ricardo also 
believed that without improved technology, the economy would stagnate.  However, he also 
argued that increased technology will only prevent stagnation for a brief period of time.  Lastly, 
Ricardo thought the discrepancy between fixed and circulating capital also led to stagnant society. 
Next, Karl Marx developed his own view on a stagnating economy.  Marx had a very 
pessimistic view of capitalism.  Marx and his followers believed the economy would eventually 
stagnate and create misery among most people.  Stagnation would occur due to the falling rate of 
profit which Marx describes in great detail.  The theory says that with each addition of capital to 
the constant capital, there will be a reduction in the amount of variable capital.  The capitalist 
derives his profits from the exploitation of the laborer. An increased capital investment in 
machinery would lead to the fall of profits and eventually to stagnation because of the loss of 
surplus-value.   
Thorstein Veblen had a very pessimistic outlook on capitalistic society also.  Stagnation, 
according to Veblen would arise due to the business cycle and the perfection of competition.  
Additionally, nationalism and the status system would play a role in a stagnation economy.  Veblen 
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maintained that stagnation would be the result of a ‘conscientious withdrawal of productive 
efficiency’ in a machine civilization.  He predicted society will end in militaristic state as a result 
of stagnation or, there will be a more equitable distribution of goods. 
John Maynard Keynes’ work in the General Theory led to further theories developed on 
stagnation.  But, Keynes left us with some of his own thoughts on the topic.  Society would be 
driven into stagnation by the discrepancy in the propensity to consume and the propensity to save.  
Also, the relationship of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest revealed 
government manipulation of interest rates may postpone stagnation for some time.  However, as 
the marginal efficiency of capital tends to fall to zero, this will lead to capitalistic society into 
stagnation. 
Alvin Hansen developed the concept of secular stagnation and the matured economy.  The 
matured economy occurs due to a declining rate in population, the disappearance of new frontiers, 
and the lack of new industries that will create jobs and investment opportunities.  Hansen admitted 
to not having concrete solutions to stagnation but his view on the result of stagnation was more 
positive than previous economists before him.  He believed that action can be taken by 
government, such as lowering taxes on workers and public investments to lessen the negative 
impacts of stagnation.    
Finally, Lawrence Summers has recently revived Hansen’s theory due to current economic 
conditions here in the United States and in other industrialized countries.  Summers points to the 
slow economic growth and higher unemployment rates despite record low interest rates as 
evidence of a stagnating economy. 
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  Most economists tend to disagree with the idea that secular stagnation is happening now 
because we have been here before.  Hansen predicted that economy would be in stagnation 
permanently back in the 1930s into the 1940s.  Those fears were revived briefly in the 1970s when 
stagflation was taking place in the United States.  But, just as it did after the Great Depression, the 
economy recovered.  So, there is no reason to believe that the economy won’t bounce back like it 
always has.   
 A study of the various theories on stagnation and current conditions reveals that there is a 
chance we will face secular stagnation in the years to come.  As Summers believes, Hansen’s 
theory has not been proven wrong, it has just been put on hold.  The baby boom after World War 
II only delayed secular stagnation.  The declining rate of population and the lack of capital 
investment is observable in today’s world.  Weak economic growth has been the norm for decades.  
 If secular stagnation is taking place, each school of economics in which we analyzed sees 
different outcomes.  Marx sees the overthrow of capitalism as the next step.  Veblen predicted a 
militaristic state.  Keynesians, such as Hansen say that stimulative policies can be enacted to 
combat stagnation but may not be permanent.   Lawrence Summers and Ben Bernanke, both New 
Keynesians mostly believe there are remedies to the problem.  Kent Kritgaard says we need a 
whole new approach to the idea of growth as he rejects the mainstream views that growth in infinite 
even in a finite biophysical environment.  
 The prospect that secular stagnation has set in has enormous consequences.   Society must 
adapt to a world of little to no growth.  There is not unlimited growth in this case, as many 
economists believe.  The market cannot correct such a situation.  I would suggest to economists to 
think outside of their normal economic theory and analyze other heterodox views.  Heterodox 
views, such as Marxian, Institutionalist, Ecological, and Post-Keynesian may provide greater 
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insight into this phenomenon than the Neoclassical and New Keynesian mainstream schools.  
Those schools are limited in scope because of the limitations of their theory.  Their theory requires 
many assumptions, such as consumer rationality, perfect competition, and flexible prices and 
wages that just cannot be replicated in this type of economy.  The mainstream views of economic 
growth may not be possible forever. 
 It would be wonderful to be able to say that the United States economy along with other 
industrialized nations such as Japan and Germany will experience strong growth and reach full 
employment.  However, conditions may be falling in place where stagnation finally sets it.  The 
prevailing low rates of interest seem to be ineffective and it’s virtually impossible for them to go 
any lower.  Alvin Hansen’s theory seems to have merit to it once again and other early economists 
seemed to be ahead of their time as well.  We cannot ignore the possibility of a stationary state.  
Instead, we must learn to adapt or change the path we are on.  This begins by breaking away from 
mainstream economic thinking and exploring all avenues for explanation.  Secular stagnation may 
already be a reality. 
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